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Women’s representation in national parliaments is examined using a large cross-national
sample. Initially, the article seems to confirm previous findings that the electoral
formula and quotas are good predictors for the proportion of women in parliament. In
line with some recent contributions, this article finds that the proportion of women in
parliament is explicable in terms of culture—particularly attitudes towards women as
political leaders. It appears that regional differences reflect differences in attitudes
relevant to women’s political representation. Drawing on recent developments on
gender quotas and insights on the influence of attitudes on gender representation,
in this article, quotas and measured attitudes are considered at the same time. Once
controlling for regional or cultural differences, the provision of voluntary party quotas
does not appear to be significant at the national level. The results are tested for robustness
over time, and using a subsample of OECD countries. This article provides further evidence
for a strong association between cultural factors and the proportion of women in
parliament.
Introduction
Despite constituting half the population, in most
countries women remain greatly under-represented
in positions of power and decision-making, such as
in national parliaments. The proportion of women in
parliament is of concern because of justice—the view
that all humans are of equal worth, and therefore have
an equal right to take part in decision-making. The
claim for equal representation stands irrespective of
whether a greater number of women in parliament
leads to a better representation of women’s interests.
Although a greater number of women in parliament
can be regarded as a necessary first step for the
representation of women’s interests, however these
interests are defined. In order to contribute towards
the goal of more women in parliament it is necessary
to understand what factors are associated with larger
proportions. In this article, the influence of institu-
tional, cultural, and other factors on the proportion of
women in national parliaments is examined. The focus
in this article is on the macro level, and the analyses
are comparative in order to tease out significant
patterns. By considering both institutional and cultural
aspects, it will be possible to appreciate the effective-
ness of gender quotas whilst also catering for directly
measured attitudes for the first time. By so doing, this
article combines recent developments on gender quotas
(Tripp and Kang, 2008; Krook, 2010) with insights on
the influence of culture on gender representation
(Norris and Inglehart, 2001; Paxton and Kunovich,
2003).
There have been several attempts at explaining the
difference in the proportion of female parliamentarians
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amongst countries. The role of institutional factors
is usually highlighted, but socio-economic aspects
affecting the supply of candidates are also frequently
considered. Despite recent interest, cultural factors are
still less frequently studied than the other two. This is
the case, even though many studies recognize the role
attitudes towards women in public positions may play,
without testing this directly (for example Paxton, 1997;
Arcenaux, 2001; Yoon, 2004; Abou-Zeid, 2006). Many
studies focus exclusively on Western societies or
advanced industrial countries.
Institutional factors, such as the electoral system, are
the most common explanation for the variance in the
proportion of women in parliament across countries.
Almost all studies find the electoral formula to be a
good predictor, with proportional representation (PR)
systems associated with higher proportions of women
in parliament than majoritarian ones (e.g. Darcy,
Welch and Clark, 1994; Paxton, 1997; Galligan and
Tremblay, 2005). PR systems may lead to higher
proportions of women in parliament because of their
larger districts, a factor also commonly supported for
the representation of women in parliament. Although
rarely spelled out, what is at work here is the
probability that a vote goes to a woman. Assuming
that there are only a few women contenders, the
likelihood that a woman is elected is increased where
more candidates are picked.
Left-wing parties used to be associated with higher
proportions of women, but in recent years, this no
longer seems to be the case (Darcy, Welch and Clark,
1994; Matland and Studlar, 1996). In the past,
left-wing parties were more likely to include women
on their lists, and higher up on party lists.
Additionally, quotas for women are generally found
to work (Yoon, 2004; Dahlerup, 2006; Tripp and Kang,
2008). Usually, gender quotas take the form of
voluntary party quotas. This means that a political
party decides to include at least a certain proportion of
women candidates, often a value between 20 and
30 per cent. In most cases, these quotas are voluntary
commitments, with no further consequences if the
target is not achieved (Dahlerup and Freidenvall,
2005).
Socio-economic factors are often suggested as
contributing variables, even though the mechanisms
involved are perhaps less clear and are rarely spelled
out. Probably the supply of qualified women is
affected. Socio-economic factors, such as the propor-
tion of women in higher education are thus approxi-
mations of the true number of suitably qualified
women in the wider population and their willingness
to come forward as candidates. Of the possible
measures, women’s share in the labour force is often
found to be associated with the proportion of women
in parliament (Rule, 1981; Norris, 1987; Mateo Diaz,
2005), especially women in professional jobs (Rule,
1987; Rule and Zimmerman, 1994; Paxton and
Kunovich, 2003). Educational variables are sometimes
used, in particular the proportion of girls in secondary
education, although the evidence for such educational
variables is mixed (Norris, 1985, 1987). The reason for
this may be that educational variables do not incorp-
orate women’s participation in public life in general.
The proportion of women in professional jobs, in
contrast, covers all aspects of supply: qualifications, plus
the willingness of women to put themselves forward for
public roles of responsibility. Measures of supply
may therefore also incorporate cultural aspects that
affect the likelihood of candidates coming forward.
There have been different approaches to try to
capture the influence of attitudes on the proportion of
women in parliament more specifically. Of interest are
attitudes akin the concept of sociological liberalism:
the general outlook on life, the roles regarded as
appropriate for different groups in society, and support
for a peaceful coexistence of different groups—often
linked to ideas of equality and social justice (Crouch,
1999). One approach is to focus on any of the
underlying factors thought to shape attitudes towards
women in politics. Regional dummy variables are
sometimes used (Moore and Shackman, 1996; Paxton,
1997; Reynolds, 1999). Although not normally spelled
out, regional variables may capture cultural differences
due to different historical experiences. For example,
access to trade routes, relative isolation, or involve-
ment in seafaring can be thought to influence attitudes
in a wider sense, and foster a certain degree of
open-mindedness (Bystydzienski, 1995; Pettigrew and
Tropp, 2006). By focusing on differences between
regions, it is not implied that regions or even countries
were homogenous, but the intuition is to capture
relevant tendencies. Another way is to look at religion,
in particular Catholicism (Rule, 1987; Leyenaar, 2004;
Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Norris, 2009). Here,
religion is highlighted for its prescriptive views on the
role of women in public life. Apart from predomin-
antly Catholic countries, Muslim countries may also be
expected as culturally restricting women’s access to the
public sphere.
A different approach is to look at measured attitudes
related to women’s position in society (Norris and
Inglehart, 2001; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003; Yoon,
2004). The intuition is that these attitudes are
influenced by a multitude of factors, including religion,
historical differences, or the level of development.
REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 97
In countries where more positive views towards
women in politics are common, women are more
likely to come forward as candidates, the elite are more
likely to support women candidates, and the electorate
are more likely to vote for women standing for
election. The few studies that included a direct
measure of attitudes towards women in politics all
found very strong associations, with more positive
views linked to a higher proportion of women in
parliament. Because of this direct influence, a direct
measure of attitudes towards women in politics is in
many ways preferable over measures that capture
underlying factors. In this article, I use a direct
measure of attitudes towards women in politics
where feasible, but I also pay attention to different
measures that might approximate attitudes, enabling
conclusions for all countries covered.
A number of hypotheses will be tested in this article.
To start with institutional factors, there are different
aspects of the electoral system that are thought to
affect the proportion of women in national parliament.
The underlying argument is that systems that are more
proportional lead to a higher proportion of women in
parliament. The electoral formula is a key factor,
influencing the levels of proportionality: PR systems
can be expected to be associated with higher proportions
of women in parliament. The proportionality of the
system can also be measured directly such as with the
Gallagher index.
Linked to factors of the electoral system is the
experience of working within certain parameters. A
longer tradition of democratic rule means that there
was more time to incorporate demands of women’s
inclusion in parliament. The intuition is that the
involved actors over time learn to effectively deal with
such demands. Consequently, a positive correlation can
be expected between the proportion of women in
parliament and the age of democracy. Another suitable
approximation could probably be gained by using
the time since women’s suffrage. In a similar vein, the
level of political rights can be understood as an
indicator of how well a democracy is established.
Political rights facilitate political communication, sug-
gesting that there is a positive correlation between the
level of political rights and the proportion of women in
parliament.
Quotas are another factor considered, and these
measures for the inclusion of women are generally
implemented on a voluntary basis. Whilst this means
that enforcement of such targets may be an issue, it
can be assumed that the presence of quotas increases
the number of female candidates at least to some
extent. Therefore, in places where parties implement
gender quotas, the number of women in parliament can
be expected to be higher. The same is true for countries
with statutory quotas.
The supply of suitably qualified candidates is
another factor considered. In places where not
enough qualified women come forward as candidates,
it is impossible to achieve high proportions of women
in parliament, even if the elite and voters would
support more women in parliament. The potential
supply of qualified candidates can be approximated by
capturing the share of girls in secondary education,
and particularly women’s involvement in the labour
force. It can be expected that there is a positive
correlation between the proportion of women in the
labour force and the proportion of women in parliament.
This is probably particularly the case for women’s
participation in professional jobs.
Turning to cultural variables, many factors can be
expected to affect the proportion of women in
parliament in one way or another. The argument is
that attitudes towards women in public positions of
power and responsibility are shaped by religious,
regional, and developmental differences. This effect
may be largest in predominantly Catholic and Muslim
countries. Somewhat different in nature is the influ-
ence of the level of development on attitudes towards
women as political leaders, where the shift from
industrial to post-industrial countries is highlighted—
at the same time a shift to post-material values with a
greater concern for women’s issues. In each case, the
underlying argument is that where attitudes towards
women as political leaders are more positive, the
proportion of women in parliament can be expected to
be higher. Attitudes measured directly should lead to
better predictions than measures based on underlying
factors. This is the case because the different factors
influencing attitudes towards women as political lead-
ers are synthesized in a way that is better captured at
an immediate stage.
Data and Methodology
Data on the proportion of women in parliament are
taken from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2006),
and are as of July 2006. The IPU provides a complete
and accurate collection of all parliamentary elections
across the world, in each case specifying the propor-
tion of women in parliament. The results reported in
this article are substantially unchanged when a measure
is used controlling for the proportion of women in
the population—the values correlate at a rate of 0.99
(P50.000).
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I focus on the 131 countries classified as free and
partly free by Freedom House (2006), because mean-
ingful and competitive elections are presumed in this
article—meaning that presence in parliament is linked
to power and involvement in decision-making. In
some places this fundamental assumption of justice is
violated, such as in repressive regimes (de Rezende
Martins, 2004; Baldez, 2006; Matland, 2006). In such
countries, the dynamics related to political representa-
tion may differ significantly, leading to different factors
being associated with higher proportions of women in
parliament (Paxton and Kunovich, 2003; Yoon, 2004;
Viterna, Fallon and Beckfield, 2008). I circumvent
these issues by excluding unfree countries in the
empirical analyses, leaving 87 free and 44 partly free
countries. In the countries covered, a noticeable
variance in the proportion of women in parliament
can be observed: between 0 and almost 50 per cent.
The distribution is unimodal with a median of
15 per cent. Since partly free countries are included
in the analysis, there are a sufficient number of
countries in all world regions.
For the institutional factors, established reference
works are drawn on, and in most cases, the classifi-
cations used are clear. Electoral systems were classified
according to their tendency as either PR (PR/MMP,
53 per cent of countries) or majoritarian (Mj/MMM,
47 per cent of countries), following Shugart and
Wattenberg (2003). The same substantive results can
be achieved with different operationalizations that
recognize more categories, such as the common
inclusion of mixed systems as a separate category.
Data on the presence of quotas are based on the Quota
Project (IDEA, 2006), and cross-checked against vari-
ous other sources, including party websites and
handbooks of elections. Quotas are classified into
voluntary party quotas, statutory quotas, and reserved
seats, as common in the literature. Because of their
small number in free and partly free countries, reserved
seats cannot be included in the main analyses.
Reserved seats for women can be found in
Bangladesh, Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania. Using
different operationalizations, such as by considering
the size of the quotas, does not change the findings
reported in this article. For the direct measure of
attitudes, a question from the World Value Survey
(2006) is used, asking respondents whether they agree
that men make better political leaders than women.
This question directly captures the essence of the
attitudes in question. This single question leads to a
slightly better model fit than scales that incorporate
related items.
In the multivariate analyses, I use ordinary least
squares regressions, and collinearity between explana-
tory variables becomes a concern. Some of the
variables measure aspects of the electoral system or
attitudes towards women as political leaders that are
closely related, and in some cases, I have multiple
operationalizations available for the same concept. It
was therefore necessary to identify key dimensions,
which was done on a theoretical basis. For the
purposes of this article, the effects of the electoral
system can probably be reduced to proportionality.
This factor is catered for using the electoral formula.
Other measures are sometimes preferred, but ultim-
ately the availability of data clearly favours the use of
the electoral formula, to which these other factors are
closely related.
In terms of institutional factors, special measures for
women are treated separately: voluntary quotas and
statutory provisions are factors independent from the
electoral formula. All variables addressing cultural
aspects are closely associated with each other. In
order to maximize the number of cases, regional
differences are used. I use a common classification:
22 countries in Western Europe, the United States,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as one region,
5 Nordic countries, 17 countries in Eastern Europe,
24 in Asia and the Pacific, 7 in the Middle East,
24 sub-Saharan countries, and 32 countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. There is a strong theor-
etical reason to capture attitudes towards women as
political leaders directly. Unfortunately, by doing so,
the sample size is reduced significantly, because only
48 of the 131 countries covered in this article include
the relevant question in the Word Value Survey.
Consequently, the analyses are carried out once with
all cases and regions, and once with fewer cases but an
immediate variable of relevant attitudes.
The use of regional variables as a measure of
attitudes towards women as political leaders can be
justified on empirical grounds, because of their
explanatory power for attitudes towards women as
political leaders. Positive attitudes towards women in
politics can be explained statistically with the prevalent
religion and whether a country can be classified as
post-industrial or not (R2 ¼ 0.69). Institutional
variables, the age of democracy, and the level of
political rights are not significantly associated with the
attitudinal variable (P40.1). Once adding regional
variables, neither religious nor developmental differ-
ences remain significant (R2¼ 0.85), suggesting that
regional differences approximate these two factors. In
other words, this analysis suggests a high level of
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correlational validity for the classification of regions
common in the literature.
In addition, the factors of the age of democracy and
political rights are also included in the analyses, on the
basis that they may be modifying variables affecting
many of the other variables. The age of democracy
measures the number of years since democracy was
established the last time, and there are 60 new
democracies established in the past 20 years. Political
rights are operationalized using data from Freedom
House (2006). Data on labour-force participation were
taken from UN statistics, and there is a range from
17 to 70 per cent of women in professional jobs across
free and partly free countries. Both empirically and
theoretically, all the identified key dimensions are
reasonably independent. For many of the variables, in
particular those of the electoral system and the
provision of quotas, I also have tried different
operationalizations, but the substantive results reported
are unaffected. Other variables considered include the
age of women’s movement, or the level of develop-
ment, leading to the same substantive results than with
the variables used in this article—although with
alternative operationalizations coding can be
problematic.
Findings
A noticeable variance in the proportion of women in
parliament can be observed between countries in 2006.
The inclusion of women more or less in proportion to
the population is uncommon. In free and partly free
countries, the highest value is achieved in Sweden, with
45 per cent women in parliament. At the same time,
however, the complete absence of women is rare. In
almost all free and partly free countries, at least one
woman is included in parliament. In 2006, the
exceptions were Kyrgyzstan, Micronesia, Nauru,
Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, the Solomon Islands,
and Tuvalu. In Kyrgyzstan, two women lost their court
case, and parliament was left with no women for the
time being. In the Solomon Islands, a number of
women stood for parliament, but none of them was
elected. A single-member system is sometimes blamed
for this absence of women in parliament. The other
countries with no women in parliament are all
countries with a small population and very small
parliaments. A single seat in such small chambers may
constitute as much as 7 per cent of all the seats
available.
In bivariate analyses, all the hypotheses seem to be
supported. Variables measuring aspects of the electoral
system and vote–seat proportionality seem to confirm
that systems that are more proportional are associated
with a higher proportion of women in parliament
(P50.05). The gender quotas introduced in countries
across the world appear to be successful: the number
of female representatives is larger in countries where
there are quotas relative to countries without
(P50.01). The results are comparable whether the
66 countries with party quotas or the 35 countries with
statutory quotas are considered. Similarly, variables of
the age of democracy (P50.000), political rights
(P50.01), labour-force participation (P50.01), and
attitudes towards women as political leaders (P50.01)
are associated with differences in the proportion of
women in parliament.
Turning to multivariate analyses, in a first step, the
modelling is designed to maximize the number of cases
in the analysis. Table 1 outlines the results of three
multivariate models. Starting with the electoral for-
mula, additional variables are introduced to increase
the model fit. Model 1 includes the electoral formula,
variables capturing the presence of gender quotas, as
well as considerations of political rights and the age of
democracy. Both voluntary party quotas and their
statutory counterparts are included. Party quotas tend
to be implemented without serious sanctions for
non-compliance (Matland, 2006). The percentage of
women in parliament is 8 per cent higher in
countries with PR systems than in countries with
majoritarian systems. The effects of voluntary party
quotas are equivalent to 1 per cent more women in
parliament (P50.01), whilst the stronger association of
statutory quotas is statistically significant at the
0.1 level. In none of the models are the other factors
substantially affected by whether all statutory quotas or
only enforced ones are included.
Considering the other variables in the model, the
effects of political rights seem negligible (P40.1). The
age of democracy, in contrast, appears to be a
significant yet substantially small factor. The unit of
the age of democracy is 100 years, since the size of the
effect is so small. The results of Model 2 suggest that it
takes just over a decade for the number of women in
parliament to increase by 1 per cent. Given the low
number of female parliamentarians in many countries,
this seems a very small effect. The interaction between
the age of democracy and the electoral formula is not
significant (P40.1) and does not add to the model fit.
In addition, I have also tested various other interaction
effects in all the models reported, with no significant
results. In particular, no significant interaction could
be observed between institutional and cultural factors.
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Model 2 includes a variable that captures attitudes
towards women in politics. In order to maintain the
full sample, this is approximated by means of regional
differences. The predicted effect of having PR rather
than a majoritarian system is reduced, but remains
statistically significant (P50.01). Once adding the
regional variable, voluntary party quotas no longer
seem to make a significant difference (P40.1), whilst
the stricter statutory variant still seems to work
(P50.05). By considering different operationalizations,
it is possible to address the fact that not all quotas are
equal. For example, the percentage at which quotas are
set varies, or not all parties in a country may use
quotas. Using different measures of quotas does not
change the reported findings substantively.
The factor that is probably affected most by the
introduction of regional variables is the age of
democracy: Model 2 suggests that the age of democ-
racy has little significant impact. Instead, regional
differences seem to matter most. Nordic countries have
higher proportions of women in parliament than
elsewhere, whilst all other regions have lower propor-
tions of women in parliament compared to the base
category of Western Europe, the United States,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Some of these
differences are marked and most of them are statistic-
ally significant. The inclusion of both free and partly
free countries means that there is a significant number
of countries in each region (N45), and the lack of
significance of sub-Saharan and Latin American
countries is not attributable to a small N. Differences
in the predominant religion of a country are another
approach to consider cultural differences. Substituting
regional with religious differences in Model 2 leads to
a lower model fit (R2¼ 0.42), but the differences are all
significant (P50.01).
Trying to cater for the supply of candidates, adding
variables on education or labour-force participation
does not increase the model fit, and the additional
variables are statistically insignificant (P40.1). This is
made visible in Model 3, but the same is the case for
subsequent models: it appears that the supply of
suitably qualified candidates is a negligible factor. This
contrasts with previous studies based on smaller
samples or a focus on Western countries only.
Now in a second step, the nature of attitudes
towards women in politics is investigated in more
detail. It can be expected that attitudes measured
Table 1 The proportion of women in parliament I
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B SE P-value B SE P-value B SE P-value
Constant 0.09 0.02 0.000* 0.15 0.03 0.000* 0.15 0.06 0.000*
Electoral formula
Mj/MMM (base) – – – – – – – – –
PR/MMP 0.08 0.02 0.000* 0.04 0.02 0.003* 0.04 0.02 0.024*
Quotas
No quotas (base) – – – – – – – – –
Party quotas 0.01 0.01 0.017* 0.01 0.00 0.132 0.01 0.01 0.548
Statutory quotas 0.03 0.02 0.099þ 0.04 0.02 0.041* 0.05 0.02 0.035*
Political rights 0.00 0.01 0.362 0.00 0.01 0.481 0.00 0.01 0.873
Age of democracy 0.08 0.02 0.001* 0.03 0.03 0.295 0.02 0.03 0.556
Women in professional Jobs 0.00 0.00 0.754
Attitudes: region
Western (base)a – – – – – –
Nordic 0.13 0.04 0.000* 0.15 0.04 0.001*
Eastern European 0.04 0.03 0.096þ 0.07 0.04 0.070þ
Asia and Pacific 0.09 0.03 0.001* 0.11 0.04 0.005*
Middle Eastb 0.11 0.04 0.003* 0.10 0.04 0.030*
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.02 0.03 0.566 0.03 0.04 0.389
Latin America 0.03 0.03 0.263 0.05 0.03 0.116
R2 0.39 0.53 0.54
aThe base category includes Western Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
bThe category Middle East also includes North-African countries.
*P50.05; þP50.1. N¼ 131.
REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 101
directly lead to a better model fit. Unfortunately, such
considerations result in a reduced sample. Table 2
includes Model 2 with only the countries where data
on measured attitudes towards women in politics are
available. This smaller sample includes a dispropor-
tionate number of Eastern European countries. A key
difference is that in the reduced sample, the variable
on the electoral system is no longer a significant factor,
although the size of the estimated effect remains
similar. This difference is due to the sample, be-
cause the electoral system is also not a significant
variable in Model 2 when restricted to the reduced
sample. For all the other variables, substantively the
results are the same, with differences being negligibly
small. The coefficients for the different regions remain
almost unchanged, even though in some cases the
number of cases is considerably small in the reduced
sample. This means that the results from the smaller
sample are likely to apply to all free and partly free
countries.
Model 4 differs from Model 2 in that a direct
measure of attitudes is used, directly measuring
attitudes towards women as political leaders. As such,
the link to political representation is closer than with
underlying cultural variables, such as the regional
differences included in Model 2. The introduction of
this variable not only increases the model fit signifi-
cantly, but also overrides all the other variables: the
estimated effects of the electoral system become smaller
when attitudes are considered. The overriding nature
of the cultural variable, reflected by standardized
coefficients, reflects findings by Paxton and Kunovich
(2003). However, here I also consider quotas as an
institutional factor, which seem to make no difference
when directly controlling for attitudes towards women
in political roles (P40.1). It is not possible to include
regional variables and the variable on women as
political leaders because of significant collinearity
issues.
The variable on liberal attitudes towards women in
politics is measured using a 4-point scale, averaged for
each country. The scale is centred to ease the
interpretation of the other coefficients in the model,
and the range across all countries is about 2 points. In
a society where the national mean differs from another
by 1 point, the proportion of women in parliament is
affected by 18 per cent. In other words, a country
where the average position towards women is most
liberal is estimated to include about a fifth more
female parliamentarians than an average country;
a country with least liberal attitudes a fifth fewer
women than an average country.
Table 2 The proportion of women in parliament II
Model 2 (reduced sample) Model 4
B SE P-value B SE P-value
Constant 0.17 0.06 0.000* 0.19 0.04 0.023*
Electoral formula
Mj/MMM (base) – – – – – –
PR/MMP 0.03 0.03 0.714 0.02 0.03 0.357
Quotas
No quotas (base) – – – – – –
Party quotas 0.01 0.01 0.201 0.01 0.01 0.336
Statutory quotas 0.04 0.02 0.092þ 0.02 0.03 0.751
Political rights 0.00 0.01 0.274 0.01 0.01 0.223
Age of democracy 0.01 0.01 0.116 0.03 0.04 0.485
Attitudes: region
Western (base) – – –
Nordic 0.09 0.04 0.037*
Eastern European 0.06 0.02 0.001*
Asia and Pacific 0.11 0.05 0.000*
Middle East 0.16 0.06 0.000*
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.01 0.01 0.917
Latin America 0.05 0.04 0.002*
Attitudes: women as leader 0.18 0.04 0.000*
R2 0.52 0.58
Model 2 is identical to the one used in Table 1, but only includes the cases also used in Model 4. N¼ 48.
*P50.05; þP50.1.
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Norris (2004) uses an indirect measure of attitudes
towards women as political leaders—the predominant
religion of a country—and suggests that institutional
factors are more significant than cultural factors, as
indicated by the standardized values. Based on
Model 2, using regional or religious variables, and
Model 4 using a direct measure of attitudes towards
women in politics, it appears that the conclusion needs
to be reversed (see also Paxton and Kunovich, 2003).
With the data used in this article, I am unable to
replicate Norris’ findings.
Adding the time since women’s suffrage to the final
model, as did Norris (2004), does not increase the
model fit, nor is the variable significant (P40.1). None
of the coefficients in any of the models is significantly
affected by this additional variable. Adding regional or
religious variables to Model 4—ignoring collinearity
issues—does not notably change the coefficients
already in the model, and none of the additional
variables is significant. This finding disagrees with
Paxton and Kunovich (2003) who found that Nordic
countries remain significantly different even once
considering attitudes towards women. Similarly, a
variable that categorizes countries into industrial and
post-industrial can be used to replace the age of
democracy in Model 4, with no substantial effect on
the reported coefficients. This suggests that the variable
on the age of democracy to some extent may capture
the effects of modernization outlined by Inglehart and
Norris (2003). Because of collinearity issues, it is
impossible to include both variables at the same time.
The multivariate analyses in the previous paragraphs
are based on different samples, and in this section,
I address the robustness of the findings in a number of
ways. First, using an analysis over time, I further
examine the relationship between attitudes and the
proportion of women in parliament. Secondly, using a
different subsample, I hope to illuminate the effects of
sample restriction in Table 2. When capturing changes
over time, the availability of data is unfortunately an
issue, because relevant questions were only added
recently to the World Value Survey. Nonetheless, even
when using a smaller timeframe, changes in the
proportion of women in parliament over time can be
expected to be associated with changes in the key
variables. I compare values for 2006 with 1995 for
reasons of data availability.
Paxton (1997) also compared changes of the
proportion of women in parliament over time. The
analysis here, however, differs in a number of ways:
rather than relying on proxies, in this section attitudes
towards women in politics are measured directly. In
addition, I consider the implementation of gender
quotas—probably the most commonly suggested inter-
vention for increasing the proportion of women in
parliament. Paxton finds no effect for supply-factors,
but suggests that the presence of PR systems and
ideology in its wider sense are significant.
In the time studied, there were no major changes in
electoral formulas. Evidence from outside the
time-span covered in this section—such as the
change of formula in New Zealand—casts doubt on
the suggestion that the electoral formula on its own is
clearly associated with sustained increases in the
number of women in parliament. The change to PR
in New Zealand in 1996 is associated with an increase
of 8 per cent more women in parliament. This is
significantly more than the 3 per cent, by which the
proportion grew in preceding elections, beginning in
the 1970s. However, the large increase in 1996 could
not be sustained: in 2001, the election after the change
of electoral formula, no further increase in the
proportion of women in parliament could be achieved,
and including the most recent elections in 2008, the
average increase is still 3 per cent per election. In
other words, the proportion of women in 2008 would
have been expected based on the linear trend starting
in the 1970s, irrespective of the change in electoral
formula. It is therefore difficult to speak of an electoral
system effect with any confidence. In France, there was
a short trial of PR in 1986, but it did not result in
above average gains for women in parliament.
Changes in political rights were operationalized by
subtracting the 1995 values of the Freedom House Index
from those of 2006. Countries that became freer are
associated with higher proportions of women in
parliament, but not significantly higher than countries
that did not (P40.1). Changes in party quotas were
recorded between 1995 and 2006, and changes in the
attitudes towards women as political leaders were
obtained by comparing the mean values of 2004 and
1995. These are the best matching time points possible
with World Value Survey data. Changes in attitudes
towards women as political leaders were recorded for
17 countries.
The number of parties introducing quotas in the
period considered is relatively small. In most countries
there were no changes; in 14 countries one or more
parties introduced voluntary gender quotas between
1995 and 2006. Of these, 13 have increased their
proportion of women in parliament. The exception is
Botswana where two parties introduced gender quotas,
but both failed to reach their target (IDEA, 2006).
However, the estimated effect of party quotas is small,
and there is no significant difference to countries
where no party introduced gender quotas (P40.1).
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A different case is Iceland where the number of parties
with quotas decreased, whilst the number of women in
parliament increased.
In contrast, there is a relatively strong correlation
between changes in attitudes and changes in the
proportion of women in parliament (r¼ 0.46,
P50.1). Counter to this correlation, in Bangladesh
an increase of women in parliament was achieved by
means of reserved seats for women (IDEA, 2006). With
the data available, it is impossible to say whether the
decreased support for women politicians in the popu-
lation is linked to the establishment of reserved seats.
In the cross-sectional analysis, quotas and reserved
seats are not significantly associated with attitudes.
Similarly, in the Philippines an all women’s party was
successfully elected in the period considered, account-
ing for almost all the changes. In India, a possible
backlash in attitudes or party political reasons might
have prevented an increase of women in parliament.
Although the evidence is limited, the analysis over
time suggests that the findings reported in this article
are robust, and that cultural variables are closely
associated with the proportion of women in parlia-
ment: where attitudes towards women as political
leaders become more liberal, the proportion of women
in parliament tends to increase. This finding is in line
with Paxton (1997), who used religion and other
proxies as measures of ideology. In addition, the
analysis here fails to find a clear indication that the
introduction of quotas is associated with higher
proportions of women in parliament.
In line with all the literature considering political
culture in one form or another, in this article issues of
causal direction cannot be resolved completely (Fuchs,
2007). Whilst a certain degree of reverse causality
cannot and should not be ruled out, it seems likely
that the main direction of influence is from attitudes
to the proportion of women in parliament rather than
the other way around. Unsurprisingly, the proportion
of women in parliament in 1995 is strongly associated
with the proportion of women in parliament in 2006
(r¼ 0.88, P50.000). The proportion of women in
parliament in 1995 is also associated with positive
attitudes towards women in politics in 2006 (r¼ 0.73,
P50.000). This association, however, does not hold
when controlling for the prevalent religion, region, or
the level of development. When regressing attitudes
towards women in politics in 2006 on regional
differences, the level of development, and the propor-
tion of women in parliament in 1995, only the first
two variables are significant covariates. This substan-
tive result can be replicated with different model
specifications and control variables. The age of
democracy, the level of political rights, the electoral
system, and the proportion of women in parliament in
1995 are not significantly associated with attitudes
towards women as political leaders in 2006 (P40.1).
This casts doubt on the argument that the proportion
of women in parliament in the past has a significant
impact on present attitudes towards women in politics,
at least for the period considered.
In order to cater for possible sampling bias
concerning the presence of quotas, I used propensity
score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to
address the effectiveness of gender quotas in the
cross-sectional analysis. Inglehart and Norris (2003)
argue that the propensity of implementing quotas is
linked to positive attitudes towards women in power,
but no such association can be determined (P40.1).
Empirically, the best prediction of the presence of
quotas was achieved using the Human Development
Index (HDI), political rights, as well as the time since
suffrage was gained (R2¼ 0.26). Using propensity score
matching, the sample could be improved, but the
presence of voluntary quotas remained insignificant.
This suggests that voluntary quotas may not be the
driving force to more women in parliament, possibly
an extra step to reflect advances elsewhere in society
(Freidenvall, Dahlerup and Skeje, 2006).
In a different analysis, I tried to address the nature
of the reduced sample used when measuring attitudes
towards women in politics directly. To this extent,
I reran the analyses with a subsample of OECD
countries. OECD countries are free and economically
developed countries. In the multivariate analysis, the
OECD subsample leads to similar results to the main
analysis in this article. Replicating Model 1 in Table 1,
only the electoral formula and the age of democracy
are statistically significant variables (P50.05). Once
introducing the regional variables, the age of democ-
racy is no longer significant, in line with the analysis
above. Similarly, voluntary gender quotas do not
appear to be associated with higher proportions of
women in parliament once controlling for regional
differences. However, in contrast to the overall
analysis, in the OECD subsample the presence of PR
systems remains a significant factor even when
controlling for attitudes towards women as political
leaders (P50.05).
The fact that the electoral formula is a significant
factor in the OECD subsample may indicate sampling
issues for the reduced sample used in Table 2.
However, when excluding Nordic countries from the
OECD subsample, the variable on the electoral formula
no longer remains significant; and the results re-
flect those reported in the overall analysis in Table 2.
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This suggests that when it comes to the representation
of women—apart from the Nordic countries—there
appears to be no substantive difference between OECD
countries and other free and partly free countries.
Results for the electoral formula remain unclear,
because in the reduced sample the variable was not
significant, despite the sample being reasonably large.
The suggestion that new democracies are substantively
different because the parliamentary system was set up
when gender issues were already salient (Norris, 1987;
Leijenaar, 1993) seems unsupported, because, once
controlling for regions or attitudes towards women in
politics, the variable for the age of democracy is
insignificant in all samples considered.
Discussion
Bivariate associations suggest that all the factors
initially identified as contributing variables for the
proportion of women in parliament are significant.
However, in the multivariate regression analyses, the
inclusion of cultural variables leads to a surprising
result. Whilst the relationship between attitudes and
the proportion of women in parliament may be
commonsensical to a certain degree, the size of the
effect is surprising. Once considering cultural aspects,
the effectiveness of voluntary gender quotas is in
doubt: the presence of voluntary party quotas is no
longer associated with higher proportions of women in
parliament. This lack of association also appeared in
the analysis over time: the introduction of quotas is
not associated with an increase in the proportion of
women in parliament greater than in countries where
no quotas were introduced. Given the fact that
voluntary gender quotas are a common measure
implemented with the aim to address the low propor-
tion of women in parliament, this lack of association
between quotas and the proportion of women in
parliament is significant for policymakers interested in
increasing the number of female representatives.
The robustness of the reported findings was tested in
a number of ways, and—once controlling for regional
differences or attitudes towards women as political
leaders—the effectiveness of unenforced gender quotas
became doubtful in each case. The fact that, contrary
to many previous studies, the electoral formula was
not a significant variable in the final model was
explained with sampling issues, although it seems
difficult to suggest a systematic effect for the electoral
formula. Looking at the subsample of OECD countries,
I argued that it is possible that some cultural aspects
are erroneously associated with the electoral formula.
For instance, it may be that part of the cultural
heritage of Nordic countries becomes associated with
the electoral formula. When removing Nordic coun-
tries from consideration, no significant differences
between countries with PR and majoritarian systems
remain in the subsample of OECD countries.
These findings do not affect the overall message of
this article that attitudes towards women as political
leaders appear to be the key drivers for the proportion
of women in parliament. What follows is that studies
entirely focusing on institutional factors probably
overestimate the effects of the electoral system, in
particular the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas.
The influence of positive attitudes towards women in
politics may also extend to aspects of the supply of
suitable candidates. Whilst in the cross-sectional ana-
lyses variables on the supply of candidates remained
insignificant, it is possible that the supply of potentially
suitable candidates—as captured in levels of education
or engagement in professional work—is secondary to
the aspect of actually coming forward as a candidate.
The former clearly is a necessary factor, but given the
relatively small number of parliamentary seats in a
country, the variables may be too generic. In contrast,
a supportive environment—as approached in terms of
attitudinal variables—can be understood as dominat-
ing in terms of supply. Unfortunately, with the data
available, it is impossible to untangle separate effects of
supply.
The results do not necessarily mean that quotas fail
to work as such; but indicate that their effect may be
more cosmetic. Unenforced voluntary gender quotas
may merely reflect a society embracing the idea of
having more women in politics, an extra assurance
rather than jump-starting a process. On the other
hand, the introduction of reserved seats—such as in
Bangladesh—or other forms of enforced electoral
engineering in order to increase the proportion of
women in parliament may have an immediate impact
(Jacquette, 1997; Norris, 2004), but such changes may
lead to backlashes in the population (Ramet, 1997;
Dahlerup, 2006). Such backlashes may have a signifi-
cant impact on the elite: assuming that many polit-
icians are primarily motivated by being re-elected
(Downs, 1957; Manin, Przeworski and Stokes, 1999),
members of the elite supportive of enforced measures
to increase the number of women in parliament may
reconsider their actions. It is in their rational interest
not to be too much out of step with the demands of
the electorate. This means in a country where a female
candidate is unlikely to gain more votes than a man,
the parties have little incentive to actively encourage
women to come forward. In some instances, women
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candidates are considered an electoral risk (Rule and
Zimmerman, 1994; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). This
means that although the actual implementation of
procedures can encourage better representation within
parties, it seems that parties are unlikely to make use
of this potential beyond what they consider beneficial
for electoral success.
In contrast, it appears that trying to change attitudes
towards women in politics may be an effective way to
approach changes to the proportion of women in
parliament in a lasting manner. This factor may be
effective because it influences both the supply and
demand side: more women coming forward as candi-
dates, as well as an increased possibility that women
are selected by the parties and the voters. The
examination of changes over time highlighted that
changes towards more positive attitudes are associated
with higher proportions of women in parliament. In
these cases, there are no other obvious causes for the
increased proportion of women in parliament—such as
reserved seats, or an all women’s party. Further
research is needed to understand the factors that
influence attitudes towards women in politics over
time: changes in the level of development, advocacy
work, or different variables—such as the role of critical
actors highlighted in recent contributions (Childs and
Krook, 2006; Curtin, 2008; Mackay, 2008; Murray,
2008).
It is important to bear in mind that voluntary
quotas appeared to be ineffective at the national level
in free and partly free countries (see also Tripp and
Kang, 2008). The analysis does not make claims about
the effectiveness of quotas within parties. In order to
make claims about the effectiveness of quotas in
individual cases, the socio-historical and political
context needs to be taken into consideration.
Comparisons of the state before and after the intro-
duction of quotas seem to indicate that quotas within
parties generally work (Ballington, 1998; Childs, 2000;
Yoon, 2004; Dahlerup, 2006), but such simple com-
parisons do not cater for the possibility that this might
be a reflection of changed attitudes. Within parties,
there might be threshold effects that make the change
in attitudes appear instantaneous. In some places, there
are also social-desirability effects, where quotas as
such become associated with notions of progress
(Baldez, 2006; Sawer, Tremblay and Trimble, 2006;
Schwindt-Bayer and Palmer, 2007).
Kunovich and Paxton (2005) suggested a number of
qualitative reasons why quotas are not associated with
the proportion of women in parliament at the national
level. Of these, the fact that not all parties in a country
use quotas, the size of the quotas, or the enforcement
of statutory quotas do not appear to make a difference
to the findings outlined. Because of data availability, I
was unable to test the compliance with voluntary
quotas adequately, and in particular the influence of
whether list positions are explicitly stated. Without
clear list positions, it is possible that most women
candidates end up in unwinnable districts or at the
bottom of party lists. This would render quotas
ineffective. The analysis in this article thus simply
indicates that once cultural variables are taken into
consideration, in practice voluntary quotas are not
associated with a higher proportion of women in
parliament at the national level. Studies that do not
consider the role of attitudes in the population may
over-estimate the effectiveness of quotas.
Quotas and affirmative action are often suggested to
overcome recruitment issues within parties—forcing
parties to actively look for suitably qualified aspir-
ants—but without diligent implementation such ac-
tions may remain ineffective. In fact, when it comes to
the successful implementation of gender quotas, the
support for these quotas in the wider population may
also play a role (Mueller, 1988; Gray, 2003).
Contrasting quota regulations in Argentina and Chile,
Gray (2003) argues that broad support for quotas
in Argentina ensured a diligent implementation, which
in turn led to more women in parliament. In Chile, in
contrast, support for quotas in the wider population
was largely absent, resulting in unenforced regulation
and no significant gain for women in politics. Rather
than focusing on the institutional part as Gray does, it
may be more appropriate to consider the incentives of
the elite and the influence of attitudes on the
proportion of women in parliament. Members of the
elite may be primarily interested in being re-elected,
and will try to reflect attitudes in the population to
make them sufficiently popular: in a country where the
population do not support a higher proportion of
women in parliament, introducing enforced measures
would expose the political elite.
At the same time, seemingly unsuccessful and
unenforced quotas can be welcomed, because they
might be a way to raise awareness of the under-
representation of women. Taking this approach, the
actual implementation of quotas, or the enforcement
of voluntary party quotas is no longer a central issue of
concern. Instead, the focus is on the discussions about
the political integration of different groups in society.
Indeed, Bystydzienski (1995) argued that discussions
about quotas and equality have the largest impact, not
the unenforced quotas that are commonplace. In
this case, however, quotas could be replaced by a
different stimulus to encourage discussions of equality
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and justice. Indeed, it appears that the introduction of
quotas in itself does not affect attitudes towards
women as political leaders. When regressing attitudes
at present on attitudes a decade ago, and whether
quotas were introduced in the meantime, the intro-
duction of quotas is not significantly associated
(P40.1), whereas attitudes in the past are
(P50.000). This analysis does not capture the discus-
sions about quotas and equality that Bystydzienski
highlighted, but suggests that the introduction of
quotas in itself does not appear to affect attitudes
towards women in politics, perhaps because not all
introductions of quotas stimulate the same level of
political discussion.
Rather than a call against institutional interventions,
the argument presented in this article should be
understood as highlighting the need of attitudinal
changes for a sustainable increase in the proportion of
women in parliament. Enforced quotas or other forms
of electoral engineering that cannot be sidestepped by
changes in electoral behaviour cannot be dismissed as
irrelevant. However, it needs to be borne in mind that
in order to make such changes sustainable, there is a
need for corresponding attitudes. If this is not the case,
progressive members of the elite may pay a price at the
elections, and there is a risk that the institutional
setting changes in the future and the proportion of
women in parliament decreases. This means that the
elite are most likely to actively influence levels of
representation in places where the electorate are either
neutral towards an increased inclusion of women in
parliament, or assign little importance to demographic
representation—meaning that there is little electoral
risk for the elite. At the same time, however, it seems
that the actions of citizens and parliamentarians are
such that they can largely adjust to a given institutional
reality. One implication is that backlashes to electoral
engineering might be temporarily limited. It seems
reasonable to assume that if the institutional setting
becomes a real obstacle in a society where there is
significant demand for more inclusion, then this
demand is translated into changes in the electoral
institutions. The opposite—changes in the electoral
system directly translating into changes in attitudes
towards women as political leaders—does not appear
to happen, because values and attitudes are only to a
small part shaped by the electoral institutions in place.
Conclusion
This article examined the factors that are associated
with the proportion of women in parliament in free
and partly free countries in 2006. The strong effects of
the electoral formula and voluntary gender quotas are
reduced once considering regional differences and
attitudes towards women as political leaders. Whilst
broadly in line with the literature that considers the
impact of cultural factors along with institutional ones,
the extent to which attitudes towards women in
politics proved dominant contrasts with many previous
studies. The results suggest that cultural factors
dominate in the case of gender representation—
particularly attitudes towards women as political
leaders. The electoral formula may also play a role,
although it cannot account for changes over time.
Further research is necessary to resolve the current
tension between theory that emphasizes changes in
attitudes and the common cross-sectional approach
due to data availability.
Voluntary gender quotas do not appear to be
associated with a higher proportion of women in
parliament, particularly when controlling for attitudes
directly. This consideration of quotas and attitudes at
the same time sets this article apart from previous
work capturing attitudes towards women directly and
the many previous studies that emphasized electoral
institutions. Although they are frequently suggested as
a means to increase the number of women in
parliament (Ballington, 1998; Childs, 2000; Dahlerup,
2006; Tripp and Kang, 2008), quotas might not be
associated with higher proportions of women in
parliament because they are not implemented dili-
gently. I argued that the elite are unlikely to force
quota regulations in places where the population is
averse to such interventions. It would be wrong to
dismiss institutional factors, despite the dominance of
attitudes towards women in politics as an explanatory
factor, since enforced measures—such as reserved seats,
or some statutory quotas—clearly work. The findings
in this article should be understood as a note of
caution for those advocating changes in electoral law
in order to increase the proportion of women in
parliament: there is insufficient evidence to believe that
changes in electoral institutions on their own will work
well to boost the representation of women in national
parliaments.
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